The debate on Kosova’s future status has reached a crucial point. The United Nations Security Council has failed to bring Kosova to supervised independence, following Russia’s declared intention to veto. With Kosova Albanians increasingly restive and likely soon to declare unilateral independence in the absence of a credible alternative, Europe risks a new bloody and destabilising conflict. The best way of ensuring regional peace and stability and lifting Kosova out of an eight-year long limbo is a timely resolution based squarely on the plan of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. This would supersede the Security Council’s stopgap compromise Resolution 1244 of June 1999 (UNSCR 1244), define Kosova’s internal settlement and minority-protection mechanisms, mandate a new international presence, and allow for supervised independence.
Ahtisaari’s plan comprises two documents: the four-page “Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosova’s Future Status” and the 63-page “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosova Status Settlement”. The Report includes the recommendation that “Kosova’s Status should be independence supervised by the international community” and justifications for this conclusion. Ahtisaari separated his recommendation on status from the much more technical Proposal, which includes a series of “general principles” and twelve annexes detailing measures to ensure a future Kosova is “viable, sustainable and stable”. The EU is to provide an International Civil Office (ICO) that will monitor and guide implementation of the settlement, and a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Rule of Law mission; NATO will provide an International Military Presence (IMP) to succeed its current Kosova Force.
The six-nation Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and U.S.) that has been guiding Kosova policy has authorized a four-month period for new talks between Pristina and Belgrade. These started in the second week of August but, given entrenched positions, are highly unlikely to achieve a breakthrough. Serbia refuses to relinquish sovereignty over Kosova; the Kosova Albanians will accept nothing less than independence. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has requested that the Contact Group report back to him on the Belgrade-Pristina talks by 10 December.
Achieving multi-ethnic accommodation inside Kosova itself is a long-term international community goal. The Ahtisaari plan is designed to achieve this. It represents maximum concessions that could be extracted from the Albanian 90 per cent majority, granting rights to a Serb minority that is roughly 7 per cent of the population which go far beyond European standards. They include the creation of more and expanded Serb-majority municipalities, with extended competencies and the right to link with one another and benefit from Serbian government assistance, special protection zones and prerogatives for the Serbian Orthodox Church; and additional parliamentary seats and double-majority rules to prevent Serbs from being outvoted on vital interest questions.
The only real alternative to the multi-ethnic supervised independence of the Ahtisaari plan is the partition of Kosova between its Albanian majority and Serbia. In this case, the former would declare independence regardless, their faith in international community promises destroyed. Serbia would reclaim part of Kosova, north of the River Ibar.
Although Serbia favours partition, its first victims would be the 60 per cent of Kosova’s Serbs who live south of the River Ibar. It would destroy the principle of multi-ethnicity in Kosova and the surrounding region, and thus defeat the strategic purpose of resolving Kosova’s status: instead of completing the puzzle of a reconstructed and pacified Western Balkans that, as declared unanimously by EU members, has a future in the European Union, partition could easily create spill-over into surrounding territories and a new unravelling of borders along ethnic fault lines.
Following the stalemate in the United Nations Security council, the Contact Group is deeply split. Its “Quint”, the U.S., UK, France, Germany and Italy, backs the Ahtisaari plan, while Russia rejects it. The EU members of the Contact Group must now act to prepare the organisation to meet its responsibilities. Inaction might lead Kosova to fracture, destabilising neighbouring countries and boosting Balkan organized crime networks. This would discredit the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its reputation as a credible international actor.
In its most recent report, Breaking the Kosova Stalemate: Europe's Responsibility, Crisis Group made the following recommendations:
To the Quint (France, Germany, Italy, the UK and U.S.):
1. Hold the Contact Group to the principles it has already adopted for Kosova’s status resolution, including no partition.
2. Proceed on the assumption that agreement with Russia on a Security Council resolution authorising implementation of the Ahtisaari plan is not achievable and that there will be no agreed settlement emerging from the Belgrade-Pristina talks authorised by the Contact Group, and concentrate efforts on implementing that plan so as to achieve orderly, conditional (supervised) independence for Kosova supported by all or a large majority of EU member states and the U.S. by April/May 2008.
3. Engage intensively with EU member states sceptical about Kosova’s independence, explaining clearly and publicly the high cost of inaction in terms of Balkans and thus European stability, and the credibility of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
4. Adopt the following attitude toward the Belgrade-Pristina talks:
(a) they should last no longer than four months and conclude no later than 10 December 2007, the reporting deadline set for the Contact Group by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon;
(b) the Kosova delegation should be put under no pressure to make concessions beyond the terms of the Ahtisaari plan, which it has already accepted, but should be encouraged to consider limited further measures with respect to Serb majority communities in the event the Serbian delegation is prepared to consider accepting independence;
(c) use the period of the talks to build maximum support within the EU for implementing the Ahtisaari plan, make clear to the Kosova authorities and Kosova Albanians the intention to achieve conditional (supervised) independence pursuant to that plan by April/May 2008, and lay the ground work for cooperation with the UN Secretariat in arranging the orderly withdrawal of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosova (UNMIK) pursuant to that schedule; and
(d) if the parties have not reached an agreement by 10 December 2007, proceed in coordination with the Kosova government and as many EU member states as possible to implement the Ahtisaari plan for conditional (supervised) independence, including a declaration of such independence that incorporates a 120-day transition period, to be completed in April/May 2008.
To the European Union and its Member States:
5. Recognise that failure to achieve a united position in support of Kosova’s conditional (supervised) independence will discredit the EU’s CFSP and European Security Strategy.
6. Prioritise Kosova as the EU’s most urgent, currently foreseeable security issue, devoting to it the time and energy required to reach agreement that:
(a) there is no practical alternative to Kosova conditional (supervised) independence on the basis of the Ahtisaari plan, which should be achieved no later than April/May 2008;
(b) as many member states as possible will recognise Kosova when it declares conditional (supervised) independence in accordance with the Ahtisaari plan following the end of talks in December 2007;
(c) the EU will provide the majority component of the international supervision envisaged by the Ahtisaari plan by deploying an International Civilian Office/European Union Special Representative (ICO/EUSR) mission and a rule of law (European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP) mission in a timely fashion, so that they can take up their responsibilities, on invitation from the Kosova government, between the declaration of conditional (supervised) independence after talks end in December 2007 and its entrance into force upon completion of a 120-day transition period in April/May 2008;
(d) sceptical member states will not refuse consensus to deploying these missions but may choose to constructively abstain pursuant to Article 23 of the Treaty on European Union; and
(e) in the alternative that sceptical member states do not wish to be associated with the deployment and operation of the ICO/EUSR and rule of law missions to the limited extent that the constructive abstention provision provides, a coalition of willing EU member states should use the enhanced cooperation provisions of Article 27 a-d of the Treaty for this purpose and make appropriate use of EU mechanisms.
7. In advance of full consensus on the above, as many member states as possible, including EU members of the Quint, should state their willingness, in the absence of an agreed settlement emerging from the Belgrade-Pristina talks, to support a Kosova declaration of conditional (supervised) independence on the basis of the Ahtisaari plan after 10 December 2007 and bring it to fruition in 2008.
8. Encourage Kosova institutions and working groups to work more urgently on preparation of the package of state-forming legislation, including the constitution envisaged in the Ahtisaari plan, and authorise EU officials in Kosova including the planning groups for the ICO/EUSR and rule of law missions, to participate more actively and widely in the process, including by vetting drafts, so that the package is ready within the envisaged schedule for conditional (supervised) independence.
9. Make clear to Serbia, in official statements and through messages passed by member states sympathetic to it, that progress on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement and more generally its relationship with the EU depend importantly on resolution of the Kosova issue.
To NATO and its Member States:
10. NATO should consult with member states contributing troops to its Kosova mission (KFOR) to ensure that none which fundamentally oppose recognising Kosova’s conditional (supervised) independence are fielding contingents by early 2008, and that their contributions are replaced by those of nations prepared to recognise that status.
11. Following a Kosova declaration of conditional (supervised) independence and recognition by the U.S. and EU member states, NATO should remain deployed in Kosova, and carry out the tasks specified for it under the Ahtisaari plan.
12. If the NATO Council does not agree to continued deployment, the U.S. and those EU member states which have recognised Kosova’s independence should deploy their forces to carry out the relevant security tasks.
To the UN Secretariat and UNMIK:
13. Allow Kosova’s institutions to work on preparations for implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, including adoption by the Assembly of a constitution and other state-forming laws.
14. Respond to a Kosova declaration of conditional (supervised) independence and recognition of Kosova by the U.S. and EU member states by turning responsibilities over to the incoming EU missions and withdrawing UNMIK in an orderly fashion.
To the Kosova Leadership:
15. Adopt an Assembly resolution stating that:
(a) the Assembly will work to adopt during its life as much of the package of state-forming legislation envisaged in the Ahtisaari plan as possible;
(b) the Assembly (or, depending on the date of elections, the expectation that the successor Assembly) will formally declare acceptance of the Ahtisaari plan and start a 120-day transition to conditional (supervised) independence on the basis of that plan after 10 December 2007; and
(c) the Assembly expects the Kosova government to use the 120-day transition to coordinate with the EU, NATO and the member states of those organisations on a strategy for the independence transition, including a security plan, and to issue invitations for them to take up the roles envisaged in the Ahtisaari plan in a timely fashion before conditional independence takes effect upon expiration of the 120-day period (April/May 2008).
Following the NATO air strikes that began in March 1999 and Milosevic's June capitulation, Kosova became a UN protectorate under the UN Mission in Kosova (UNMIK) with UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). From April 2002, UNMIK followed a policy of “standards before status”, in order to defer pressures within Kosova for independence. This policy was brought to life with the re-engagement of the Contact Group in 2003 and its announcement that the review of final status could begin mid-2005 if Kosova’s fledgling institutions met benchmarks of good governance and inter-ethnic accommodation.
Tensions exploded in March 2004 in Kosova, with Albanian rioters targeting the Serb population and UNMIK. Unfounded allegations of Serbs drowning Albanian children sparked fighting in Mitrovica, leading to two days of Kosova-wide riots that killed 19 and wounded 900. The KFOR and UNMIK responses were disorganised and harmed their credibility, particularly amongst Serbs. Significant progress has been achieved in the three years since, during which the risk of renewed violence and the concept of earned independence have driven the status process in uneasy tandem.
In October 2005 UN Special Envoy Kai Eide concluded that there was nothing to gain from further delay, and the Secretary-General appointed former president of Finland Martti Ahtisaari to lead the settlement effort. From February 2006 through September, Ahtisaari’s office (UNOSEK) engaged the negotiating teams of Kosova and Serbia in several rounds of direct talks in Vienna and mounted a number of expert missions to both capitals.
After a significant delay to allow for Serbia’s 21 January 2007 elections, Ahtisaari presented his draft Comprehensive Proposal to both Belgrade and Pristina on 2 February. After additional meetings with the two sides in Vienna, the UNOSEK status negotiations were formally closed on 10 March. Ahtisaari declared the talks exhausted, stating that additional efforts would not bring the sides closer to a compromise and that “a sustainable solution of Kosova’s status is urgently needed”. His plan is now before the UN Security Council.
Report of the UNSC fact-finding mission to Kosova, 4 May 2007, and meeting record of the UNSC discussion of the report, 10 May 2007
The Ahtisaari plan, comprising "The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosova Status Settlement" and "The Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General on Kosova's Future Status"
UNOSEK documentation of the Kosova status talks, February 2006-March 2007
"The Guiding principles of the Contact Group for a settlement of the status of Kosova", 7 October 2005, and other Contact Group statements of 2005-2007
Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the UN Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council transmitting 2nd Eide Report, S/2005/635
Recent Reports of the UN Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosova and Meeting Records of their discussion in the UN Security Council
Letter dated 17 November 2004 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2004/932 (includes Eide Report)
Kosova Standards Implementation Plan, 31 March 2004, and European Partnership Action Plan, 9 August 2006
UNMIK’s Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, 15 May 2001
Security Council resolution 1244, 10 June 1999
Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, also known as the "Kumanovo Agreement", 9 June 1999
The Rambouillet draft accords, 23 February 1999.